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Abstract 
 Through its recommendations, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has 
helped the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) introduce regulations that have helped to 
curtail icing accidents
1
 (an occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft where as a 
result of the operation of an aircraft, any person receives fatal or serious injury or any aircraft 
receives substantial damage) and incidents
1
 (an occurrence, other than an accident, associated 
with the operation of an aircraft that affects or could affect the safety of operations). However, 
"the only acceptable safety goal of zero accident," proposed by former Secretary of 
Transportation, Federico Fabian Pena, has not materialized.  The aviation industry each year 
experiences more accidents and incidents. Steven D. Green of Flight Operations Research, 
Underhill, Vermont, researched US inflight icing accidents and incidents from 1978 to 2005.
3
 
Using the NTSB online database, he observed that 645 accidents and incidents occurred in the 
US from 1978 to 2005. He identified another 299 incidents in the NASA Aviation Safety 
Reporting System (ASRS) reports during the same period. The purpose of this thesis is to update 
and expand upon Mr. Green's research by studying US inflight icing accidents and incidents 
from 2006 to 2010. The NTSB and ASRS databases were respectively, the primary means of 
obtaining accident and incident reports. The databases revealed 228 icing related accidents and 
30 inflight icing related incidents from 2006 to 2010. Forty of the accidents were related to 
inflight icing occurring on the wings, fuselage or control surfaces. 
 From all of the reports sampled it was determined that an aircraft in cruise is more likely 
to accrete ice than in any other phase of flight. Furthermore, aircraft in cruise are more prone to 
VI 
 
inflight icing during instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) than in visual meteorological 
conditions (VMC). Throughout this report there did not appear to be a direct correlation between 
the number of flights and inflight icing accidents or incidents. Additionally, it was determined 
that icing events depended more upon the ice protection system (IPS) equipment, its use and 
effectiveness, as well as the management of ice accretion by the aircrew.  
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CHAPTER 1 
1.1 Introduction and General Information 
Inflight icing accidents have been catastrophic to the aviation industry. The most recent 
commercial fatal icing accident in the US occurred at Clarence Center, New York, on February 
12, 2009. Fifty souls were lost in this accident involving a Colgan Air Inc. Bombardier DHC-8-
400 operating as Continental Flight 3407. Other deadly accidents have also occurred over the 
years. On January 9, 1997, the Embraer EMB-12RT collided with terrain at Monroe, Michigan, 
killing 27 people.  Similarly, the Avions de Transport Regional ART – 72 collided with terrain at 
Roselawn, Indiana, killing 68 people. Twenty seven people perished in the Fokker 28-4000 (F-
28) accident on March 22, 1992, in Flushing, New York. In 1987, an icing related accident at 
Denver, Colorado involving a McDonnell Douglas DC – 9 – 14 aircraft killed 28 people. 
These accidents and others have generated considerable interest into researching inflight 
icing accidents. The NTSB is the primary repository of inflight icing accident reports. NASA's 
ASRS is also a repository of inflight icing related incidents. Although the ASRS reports are not 
investigated to check the veracity of the claims, the reports help to understand the aircrews’ 
actions as they encounter icing conditions. 
The results of icing related accident studies have had a great influence in the 
improvement of aviation safety. These results have led to the introduction of IPS and de-icing 
fluids, and to the development of regulation changes. Among the changes are rules specifying 
procedures for airspeed, and flaps selection in icing conditions.
9
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Meteorological forecasts over the years have not always been reliable. Pilots sometimes 
encounter unpredicted icing conditions en route which put them in dangerous situations. The 
introduction of the IPS has helped to drastically reduce the intensity of icing accidents, but the 
best way to avoid icing accidents has been avoidance of icing conditions. However, with the ever 
increasing demand for air transportation and scheduled flights, avoidance cannot always be 
relied upon. The IPS, although very useful, has not been able to completely overcome inflight 
icing accidents. Some aircraft equipped with IPS and certified to fly in moderate icing conditions 
encounter inflight icing that their IPS cannot shed, and, therefore, must request a climb or 
descent out of the icing conditions from air traffic controllers (ATC). 
The most common experience that aircraft encounter in icing conditions are performance 
degradation, loss of control and stall. These events (defined in section 2.25) do not necessarily 
occur in chronological order. Depending on the icing severity, the aircraft can experience loss of 
control or stall that can lead to collision with terrain or a hard landing. Steven D. Green of Flight 
Operations Research, Underhill, Vermont, researched inflight icing accidents and incidents from 
1978 to 2005.
3
 He observed that aircraft’s scale is more significant to icing events than pilot 
training, pilot experience, icing equipment and icing certification. This is because different 
categories of aircraft react differently to ice accretion. The effects of moderate icing (icing with 
rate of accumulation of 1 to 3 inches (2.5 to 7.5 cm) per hour
5
) on the flying characteristics of a 
twin turboprop engine with 50 + seats will be different than a single reciprocating engine with 1 
to 4 seats. He also came to the conclusion that icing events are prevalent at near freezing 
temperatures and ceilings of one thousand feet or less. These conditions have moisture contents 
conducive to airframe icing.  
3 
 
This thesis was carried out to build upon Mr. Green's work and update the US inflight 
icing accidents and incidents from 2006 to 2010. The study takes into account geographic 
distribution of the accidents using the FAA’s regional zoning 6, meteorological properties, pilot's 
experience, IPS usage, and event sequence by aircraft scale based on the General Aviation Air 
Taxi Activity (GAATA) scale index
10
 shown in Table 1 (all tables shown in appendix I). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
CHAPTER 2 
2.1 Methodology and Data Collection 
 The NTSB Accidents and Synopses online database
1
 is the primary source of information 
for this study. All of the accidents studied in this report were retrieved from the NTSB online 
database. This database can be accessed through the web address www.ntsb.gov. A series of 
search strings were used to query the NTSB database. Starting with the dates (January 1, 2006 to 
December 31, 2010), the database yielded 9361 accidents. To narrow the sample space to icing 
related accidents, the string “icing” was introduced in the narrative cell of the database. This 
search yielded 292 accidents. After reading the synopses of these accidents, it was discovered 
that some of the reports were related to pre-taxi de-icing. The remaining accidents were then 
filtered to eliminate all accidents that were not related to inflight icing. This reduced the sample 
space to 228 accidents. The accidents which were caused by carburetor icing or engine failure 
were also filtered out. Other strings such as “ice", "snow", "rime", "freezing", and "frost” were 
used; however, these strings yielded fewer accidents than the “icing” search revealed. These 
accidents were also filtered to include those that were not captured by the "icing" string. Forty 
inflight icing accidents (shown in the appendix) were found to have experienced performance or 
aerodynamic stability and control events such as stall, loss of control or performance, hard 
landing, etc., which were not a result of engine failure or carburetor icing. These accidents 
occurred when the aircraft flew in icing conditions and ice accreted on the wings, fuselage, 
windshield or control surfaces of the aircraft. 
The NASA ASRS
2
 was also searched with the strings “ice% OR icing% OR freeze% OR 
rime% OR glaze% OR sleet% OR frost%“. This yielded 1221 incident reports. These report's 
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synopses were reviewed and those that did not experience any performance or aerodynamic 
stability and control events mentioned above were omitted. For instance, the string “snow” 
mostly yielded reports about incidents that occurred when there was snow on the runway. 
Finally, the synopses and narratives yielded 30 incidents which involved inflight icing leading to 
performance or aerodynamic stability and control event. The incident reports from the ASRS are 
discussed separately from the NTSB, since the ASRS reports are not investigated to prove or 
disprove the claims. This makes the ASRS reports highly subjective. However, the ASRS reports 
help to understand the incidents from the pilot’s perspective, and offer a glimpse at how the 
inflight situations were managed during the ice accretion period. 
2.2 Development of Data 
The final database consists of accidents and incidents that were found to have 
experienced performance or aerodynamic stability and control events. The synopses and 
narratives of the accidents and incidents were carefully studied to identify the trend of the 
aerodynamic events occurred. Among these trends are uncontrolled descent, high sink rate, loss 
of control, performance degradation, and stall. The final database includes all accidents and 
incidents for which these performance and aerodynamic stability and control events occurred as 
a result of inflight icing on wings, fuselage, windshield or control surfaces. It involves accidents 
and incidents that accreted ice from initial climb to the landing phase of the flight. Since the 
focus of this thesis is inflight icing, accidents and incidents which resulted from taxi and take off 
icing were not considered in this study. During incidents in general, the pilots were able to regain 
control and either continued the flight to the destination or diverted to a nearby airport for an 
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emergency landing. However, the accidents typically resulted in stall and inflight collision with 
terrain or water. 
2.21 Meteorology 
 Meteorological information about temperature, dew point, visibility, wind speed, wind 
direction, and surface precipitation type were extracted from the reports. The phase of the flight 
that the pilot or air crew recognized ice accretion was also extracted; however, the exact point 
during the flight that ice accretion started could not be determined by the investigators. In some 
reports the pilots were able to estimate the thickness of the ice, while some were determined after 
the accident. The latter measurements are rough estimates as it takes time for investigators to 
reach the accident site and determine the thickness of ice accretion. Contamination of these 
measurements can occur by either sublimation due to temperature difference resulting in less ice 
accretion than experienced inflight or additional ice formation resulting in more ice accretion 
than experienced inflight. Some accidents involved post accident fires therefore, the thickness of 
ice that was accreted inflight could not be determined. 
2.22 Pilot Experience 
 Pilot experience was also extracted to determine the pilot’s total flight hours and flight 
hours in the aircraft model/type with which the accident or incident occurred. This was analyzed 
by aircraft’s scale index (GAATA scale index)10 and certification (FAR Parts 91, 121 and 135). 
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2.23 Aircraft Analysis by Scale 
Data was collected about the type of aircraft involved in the accidents. These aircraft were 
classified based of the number of engines and seating capacity. The FAR Part under which the 
aircraft were operating was also extracted from the reports. The General Aviation Air Taxi 
Activity scale index
10
 used by the FAA in the 2002 survey was used to classify the aircraft as 
shown in Table 1. The GAATA scale index covers up to civilian aircraft with 13 + seats, so the 
modified scale index 
3
 was used to cover larger civilian aircraft. 
2.24 Aircraft Analysis by IPS Certification 
 The FAA permits aircraft equipped with ice protection systems to operate in light icing 
conditions (icing with 1/4 inch to one inch (0.6 to 2.5 cm) rate of accumulation per hour). Data 
was therefore collected about the aircraft’s IPS status. Those equipped with IPS were also 
considered whether the systems were operated during the ice accretion period or not. There is a 
dearth of information about the IPS status of some of the aircraft because some reports never 
state whether they were equipped or activated. Mr. Green
3
 observed that in the cases that the 
IPSs were operated, there was no information to determine whether it was operated correctly. 
2.25 Aerodynamic Stability and Control (ASC) Events 
 Performance and ASC events contributed to the inclusion or exclusion of an accident or 
incident for the discussion. Performance degradation, loss of control, stall, high sink rate, and 
hard landing were the primary events that were used for the discussion. The accidents were 
classified based on the following occurrences:
3 
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 Loss of control: The occurrence in which an uncontrolled descent was cited as the 
final flight phase. “In order to enter an uncontrolled descent, control must be 
lost”.3 
 Stall: The occurrence in which loss of control was cited or added and no 
preceding aerodynamic event was found; “if the loss of control resulted from ice 
accretion, then some type of flow separation must have occurred."
3
 
 Loss of Performance: The occurrence in which insufficient performance was 
retained to avoid an inflight collision with terrain, water or obstacles, but no 
indication was present of either a stall or loss of control. 
 High Sink Rate: Events that terminated with a hard landing within the intended 
touchdown zone assuming no other aerodynamic event was found. 
2.26 Regional Distribution of Events 
 The FAA has zoned the United States into nine regions: Alaska, Central, Eastern, Great 
Lakes, New England, Northwest Mountain, Southern, Southwest, and West-Pacific regions. The 
accidents were classified under these regions to develop a regional distribution of accidents in 
the US. The flight concentration in these regions were based on the total flight hours and 
compared with the number of accident(s) per state in the region. The location of the incidents 
from ASRS could not be determined because the reports do not state where they occurred. 
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CHAPTER 3 
3.1 Five Most Fatal Contemporary Icing Accidents 
 The aviation industry over the years has suffered many catastrophic accidents as a result 
of icing. Notable among them is the Colgan Air flight at Clarence Center, New York; Comair 
flight at Monroe, Michigan; American Eagle flight at Roselawn, Indiana; USAIR flight at 
Flushing, New York; and Continental flight at Denver, Colorado. To bring into bare an extent of 
damages icing accidents had caused, this chapter presents the five most catastrophic icing 
accidents involving commercial US flights. 
3.11 Colgan Air Inc. Accident at Clarence Center, New York 
 On Feb 12, 2009, the Bombardier Inc DHC – 8 – 402 twin engine aircraft impacted the 
ground at 22:17 EST. Four crew members and 45 passengers aboard the aircraft were killed in 
addition to one person on the ground. The aircraft was on an instrument approach to Buffalo-
Niagara International Airport (KBUF) in Buffalo, New York, but crashed into a residence in 
Clarence Center, New York, about 5 nautical miles northeast of the airport. 
 The NTSB report
1
 stated that “Colgan Air’s inadequate procedure for airspeed selection 
and management during approaches in icing conditions” were among the probable causes of the 
accident. The aircraft was equipped with ice detection system on the fuselage, wings, tails, 
propellers, windshield and the pilot and copilot’s window. The ice detection parameter in the 
cockpit was programmed to show “detected” when there was ice accumulation and “not 
detected” after the ice was completely shed. From 22:07:53 to 22:08:58, 22:09:21 to 22:11:05 
and 22:11:17 to 22:12:17 the ice parameter indicator changed from “not detected” to “detected” 
then back to “not detected”. It also changed from “not detected” to “detected” from 2216:25 until 
the end of the recording. Although these indications are very useful for airspeed selection in 
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icing conditions, they do not adequately inform pilots as to when to activate the IPS. The Flight 
crew’s workload management also contributed to this accident. NTSB1 stated that the captain 
inappropriately responded to the activation of the stick shaker and also failed to monitor the 
airspeed which resulted in stall. Furthermore, the flight crew also failed to observe the sterile 
cockpit procedures. 
3.12 Embraer EMB – 120RT Accident at Monroe, Michigan 
 On January 9, 1997, the Embraer EMB – 120RT twin engine aircraft operated by 
COMAIR, INC impacted the ground on approach to runway 3R at Detroit Metropolitan Wayne 
County Airport (KDTW). The accident occurred approximately 19 nautical miles southwest of 
the airport killing 3 flight crew and 26 passengers aboard the aircraft. This accident also resulted 
in a post crash fire. The NTSB
1
 investigation revealed that it was likely that the aircraft had 
gradually accumulated a thin rough glaze/mixed ice coverage on the leading edge deicing boot 
surfaces as it descended from 7000ft MSL to 4000ft MSL through icing conditions. The 
investigation also stated that the pilot might not have been aware of the icing conditions and that 
the “FAA’s failure to require the establishment of adequate minimum airspeed for icing 
conditions”1 was a probable cause of the accident. 
3.13 America Eagle Airline Accident at Roselawn, Indiana 
 An inflight icing accident involving the twin engine ATR – 72 -212 occurred on October 
31, 1994, at Roselawn, Indiana. The aircraft en route to Chicago, Illinois, was in a holding 
pattern for sequencing into Chicago's O'Hare Airport (KORD). Upon clearance to descend from 
10000ft to a newly assigned altitude of 8000ft, it rolled approximately 70 degrees right wing 
down followed by a rapid descent and crashed into the ground. Attempt by the aircrew to recover 
the airplane from the initial roll proved futile. Among the probable causes cited by the NTSB
1
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was ice accretion beyond the de-ice boots while the airplane was in a holding pattern, which 
resulted in loss of control. Four crew members and 64 passengers aboard the aircraft were killed. 
3.14 USAIR INC. Accident at Flushing, New York 
 Another fatal icing related accident occurred on March 22, 1992, which caused the death 
of 2 crew members and 25 passengers. However, twenty three people including one crew 
member survived the accident with serious and minor injuries. The accident involved a twin 
engine Fokker - 28 – 4000 aircraft. The aircraft was de-iced twice before leaving the gate, but 
there was a 35 minute holding period between the second de-icing and take off. The NTSB
1
 
report states that the 35 minutes exceeded the 11 minutes safe holding period for the type 1 de-
icing fluid used. The aircraft accumulated ice under the wing during this time interval, which 
was unnoticed by the pilot. The aircraft collided with the terrain right after takeoff from Flushing 
Airport (KLGA), New York. 
3.15 Continental Airlines Inc. Accident at Denver, Colorado 
 On November 15, 1987, an inflight icing related accident occurred at Denver, Colorado, 
Stapleton International Airport now Denver International Airport (KDEN), involving a 
McDonnell Douglas DC – 9 – 14 aircraft. Among the probable causes of the accident reported by 
the NTSB
1
 was the accumulation of ice on the lifting surfaces. The aircraft was de-iced but there 
was a 27 minute delay between final de-icing and takeoff. The aircraft is believed to have 
accumulated ice on the lifting surfaces during the 27 minutes between de-icing and take off. This 
accident resulted in 28 fatalities and 54 serious and minor injuries. 
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CHAPTER 4 
4.1 Results and Discussion 
 Steven Green
3
 observed that aircraft are more prone to icing events under IMC than 
VMC from 1978 to 2005. Out of the 40 accidents from 2006 to 2010, 21 occurred under IMC, 
while 19 occurred under VMC. One would have expected the IMC accidents to have greatly 
exceeded that of the VMC, but the IMC accidents exceed the VMC accidents to 2. Intuitively, 
pilots and air crew are more vigilant for icing when flying under IMC. The FAA GAATA 
survey
10
 is a repository of aircraft exposure to IMC, VMC and total hours of flight for general 
aviation and part 135 aircraft. The 2009 GAATA survey is the most current data available. Out 
of approximately 98.6 million total flight hours from 2006 to 2009, 86% were under VMC with 
the remaining 14% under IMC. This might be the reason why the VMC accidents amount almost 
to the same number as the IMC accidents. Although flights under IMC comparatively 
contributed to a smaller percentage of the total flight hours, it also contributed to the greater 
percentage of the number of accidents. This means that aircraft are more prone to inflight icing 
under IMC than VMC. This is not to trivialize the need for aircrew to be on the lookout for icing 
under VMC, since a lot of inflight icing accidents have occurred under VMC. 
 The 1 to 3 seats and 1 to 4+ seats categories based on the GAATA scale index, 
contributed to the greatest number of hours under VMC. These aircraft are typically not 
equipped with IPS and ostensibly do avoid flying under IMC. However, due to occasional 
uncertainty in weather forecasts, some of these aircraft end up in IMC even after filing VMC 
flight plans. Mr. Green
3
 observed that from 1978 to 2005, the 1 to 3 seats scale accounted for the 
least amount of total flight time under IMC exposure. This scale of aircraft, he explained, are 
13 
 
single engine aircraft such as Cessna 150 which typically do not have the equipment to fly in 
IMC. He also observed that IMC exposure increased with increase in aircraft size. This was also 
the trend from 2006 to 2010. Larger aircraft, such as the 7+seats and above, are typically 
equipped with an IPS and pilots who have extensive training and flight experience under IMC.    
 As much as 50% of the accidents occurred when there was no surface precipitation at the 
accident site. Snow and rain contributed 10% each. Freezing rain, freezing drizzle, ice pellets and 
ice crystal contributed 2.5% each, while the remaining 20% occurred under unknown surface 
precipitation. From 1978 to 2005, Mr. Green
3
 observed that freezing precipitation and snow 
accounted for 33% and 32% respectively of inflight icing accidents. These values would be more 
useful if there were ways to determine the type of precipitation that the accident aircraft went 
through from the period prior to ice accretion, and the occurrence of the first performance or 
aerodynamic stability and control event prior to the accident. Unfortunately, the current state of 
the art is not capable of providing this data. ICEPRO
7
 software although yet to be integrated into 
transport aircraft, is purported to have the capability to inform aircrew of particular inflight icing 
conditions, icing severity, and how these icing conditions may alter the aircraft’s baseline 
performance, and stability and control. The surface precipitation data does little to explain 
exactly what the aircraft went through inflight before the accident. It is possible for an aircraft to 
accumulate inflight icing in an area with little or no precipitation, but end up stalling and 
crashing at a place with entirely different surface precipitation. Figure 1 (all figures shown in 
appendix II) shows the statistical display of the surface precipitation data. 
 Statistical display of the meteorological parameters is shown in Table 2. In order to 
calculate the percentiles the temperatures were converted from degree Celsius to degree 
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Fahrenheit to avoid distortions by negative numbers. Fifty percent of the accidents occurred 
under a ceiling of 1600ft. From 1978 to 2005 Mr. Green
3
 observed that aircraft are more prone to 
icing under a 1000ft ceiling. This is because near surface ceilings typically have moisture 
contents that support inflight icing. 
 Approximately 62% of the accidents occurred at surface temperature greater than 0
o
C, 
while 38% occurred at surface temperature less than or equal to 0
 o
C. All of the accidents 
occurred between +21
o
C and -21
o
C (surface temperature). Although the scope of the study is 
only 5 years, it can be inferred from this data that inflight icing is less likely to occur at surface 
temperatures greater than 21
o
C since inflight icing occurs only at freezing temperature. From 
1978 to 2005, Mr. Green developed a typical icing surface interquartile model (Table 3) for the 
above meteorological parameters. The 1
st
 quartile or 25
th
 percentile, interquartile means (IQM), 
and 3
rd
 quartile respectively represent 25%, 50% and 75% of the events. This is more useful 
since it covers many years and therefore, aircrews can expect icing when flying under these 
conditions. 
 Steven Green stated in his publication, “A study of U.S. Inflight Icing Accidents, 1978 to 
2002. AIAA 2006 – 82,” that “a reported visibility of 2 to 5 miles would not appear to be 
problematic”; however, 84% of the accidents from 2006 to 2010 occurred with reported visibility 
of 3 to 10 miles with 84% of those occurring under reported visibility from 5 to 10 miles. This is 
to say that although flying under VFR might not seem problematic as Steven
3
 explains, aircraft 
are equally prone to inflight icing accidents under VFR as IFR depending on inflight temperature 
and moisture content. 
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 Out of approximately 81 million total flight hours from 2006 to 2009, 53% was under 
IFR. The single reciprocating engine with 4 or more seats based on GAATA scale index 
contributed to 42.5% of the accidents. These aircraft are typically not certified to fly under icing 
conditions. As discussed in the incidents reports obtained from the ASRS, some pilots file for 
VFR but inadvertently end up in IFR which in most cases depending on pilot experience and IPS 
equipment, lead to a decision to land at a nearby airport. Sixteen out of the 17 single 
reciprocating engine aircraft with 4 or more seats operated under FAA Part 91 at the time of the 
accident as general aviation aircraft. This was expected because these aircraft were either not 
equipped with IPS or there was no information about their IPS status. These aircraft are generally 
not certified to fly under icing conditions. For research purposes the NTSB report will be more 
informative if the IPS status of every accident/incident aircraft is explicitly stated. 
 The 20 to 50 and 50+ twin turboprop engine aircraft and the single reciprocal engine 
aircraft (1 to 3 seats) contributed to the least number of accidents as shown in Table 4. This is not 
surprising since the single reciprocal engine aircraft are not certified to fly under icing 
conditions. The 20 to 50 and 50+ twin turboprop engine aircraft operate under FAA Part 121: air 
carrier, and are required to have IPS. Since its introduction, IPS has helped commercial flight 
operators mitigate icing related hazards since the avoidance of icing conditions cannot be relied 
upon. However, there have been instances where the IPS has failed to operate or operated 
without shedding all accreted ice. Steven Green
3
 noted that when IPS’ were operated there was 
no information to determine whether they were operated correctly or at the right time and/or 
duration. Aircraft with manual IPS are operated solely by the judgment of the aircrew. The 
NTSB reports on aircraft equipped with IPS do not provide information about how the IPS was 
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operated. Some reports also do not state whether the accident aircraft was equipped with IPS. 
From Figure 3 the status of the IPS equipment was unknown for 22 of the accidents.  
 FAA introduced new regulations on August 3, 2009 that changed the certification 
standards for transport category airplanes. However, the new rules apply only to new transport 
aircraft designs. It fails to address transport aircraft in existence prior to August 3, 2009. 
According to the FAA
5
, the new regulations state that new transport aircraft must incorporate 
one of the following measures to detect icing and activate the IPS when flying under icing 
conditions:  
a. An ice detection system that automatically activates or alerts pilots to turn on the ice 
protection system. 
b. A definition of visual signs of ice buildup on a specified surface (e.g., wings) combined 
with an advisory system that alerts the pilots to activate the ice protection system; or 
c. Identification of temperature and moisture conditions conducive to airframe icing that 
would tip off pilots to activate the ice protection system. 
The standards further require that after initial activation, the ice protection system must operate 
continuously, automatically turn on and off, or alert the pilots when the system should be cycled. 
 Although these new regulations are very important, they fail to address the old transport 
aircraft that are still in operation. Some already have an ice detection system that alerts pilots 
when there is ice accretion, but do not specify where on the aircraft that ice has accreted. There is 
also no information about the thickness or type of ice accreted. The Feb 12, 2009, accident at 
Clarence Center, New York, involved the Bombardier Inc DHC – 8 – 402 twin engine aircraft 
that was equipped with an ice detection system on the fuselage, wings, tails, propellers, 
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windshield and pilot and copilot’s window. The NTSB investigation revealed that the ice 
detection parameter in the cockpit was programmed to show “detected” when there was ice 
accumulation and “not detected” after the ice had been cleared. Between 2207:53 to 2208:58, 
2209:21 to 2211:05 and 2211:17 to 2212:17, the ice parameter indicator changed from “not 
detected” to “detected” then back to “not detected”. It also changed from “not detected” to 
“detected” from 2216:25 to the end of the recording. However, the ice parameter indicator did 
not tell the pilot the intensity of the accreted ice. Neither did it tell the pilot when to operate the 
IPS. Without giving the pilot information on operating the IPS, the ice detected message only 
becomes useful for airspeed selection. In this accident the pilot failed to monitor and eventually 
stalled. 
 An aircraft in the cruise phase is more likely to accrete ice than any other phase. Ice 
accretion in 40% of the accidents from 2006 to 2010 was detected during the cruise phase of the 
flight. This is consistent with Steven Green's
3
 observations on inflight icing accidents from 1978 
to 2005. The majority of the accident aircraft accreted ice during the cruise phase of the flight. 
This should be expected since cruise forms the greater duration of most air transportation. Figure 
2 shows the distribution of the number of events by the phase of flight. 
 Out of the 40 accidents, only 2 recovered from stall. Five resulted in hard landing, 18 
resulted in inflight collision with terrain and 15 resulted in a ground collision with ground or 
water. This is consistent with what Mr. Green observed from 1978 to 2005. Mr. Green observed 
that 53% of the accidents resulted in inflight collision with terrain, while 3.08% and 23.82% 
terminated in stall recovery and hard landing, respectively. Figure 4 shows the distribution of the 
terminating events from 2006 to 2010. 
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 The research also considered the pilots total flight hours and the hours in the accident 
aircraft model/type. This was done only for the pilot in command as there were no details about 
the copilot’s flight experience. In 14 of the accidents, the pilot in command’s flight experience in 
the type/model of aircraft was unknown. For research purposes, the total flight hours of the 
captain and the first officer in type/model of the accident aircraft would be very useful. The box 
and whiskers plot in Figure 5 shows the total flight hours for the scales of aircraft that 
contributed to the greater number of the accidents. All the scales of aircraft in Figure 5 show 
extreme values to the right. The lower part of the boxes, the middle line and the upper part 
respectively represent the lower quartile (median of the lower half of the data), the median and 
the upper quartile (median of the upper half of the data). 
 The FAA Part under which the aircraft were operating was also considered. Figure 6 
shows that 80% of the accidents operated under FAA Part 91. 15% operated under Part 135, 
while 5% operated under Part 121. The Part 91 aircraft by regulation
9
 are mostly prevented from 
operating in moderate icing. These aircraft, personal and business/corporate flying jets ranging 
from single engine with four seats through corporate jets, are most common in icing events, 
Steven Green
3
 explained. He further explained that unlike Part 135 which demands considerable 
amount of training of crew members, Part 91 does not but solely relies on the licensing 
requirement applicable to all flights. Part 121 aircraft are mostly scheduled air carriers. These 
aircraft are equipped with IPS hence their contribution to a smaller percentage of the accidents. 
 The Part 91 aircraft which contributed to 32 out of the 40 accidents also accounted for a 
greater percentage of the total flight hours as show in Figure 7. The single reciprocal engine 1 to 
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4 seats aircraft which operated under Part 91 contributed to approximately 39.5% of the total 
flight hours. It’s therefore not surprising it contributed to 32 of the accidents. 
 
 The most common ASC events in the accidents were stall and loss of control. In most 
reports, these events were explicitly stated. Stall was inferred from reports that cited loss of 
control as the primary aerodynamic event without any other occurrence. From 1987 to 2005, 
most accidents
3
 involved stall, which was followed by loss of control. This trend was expected as 
inflight icing increases the stall speed; the Federal Aviation Regulations Aeronautical 
Information Manual
8
 explains that inflight icing has a cumulative effect on the performance of 
aircraft. It explains that inflight icing comes with reduced thrust, increased weight, loss of lift, 
and increased drag. This results in increased stall speed and performance degradation. It further 
explains that ½ inch of ice can reduce the lifting power of an aircraft by 50% and increase 
frictional drag by the same amount. Figure 8 shows the distribution of primary performance and 
ASC event. Twenty one (approximately 53%) of the accidents from 2006 to 2010 experienced 
stall and loss of control. 
 The accidents were also classified using the FAA nine regional zones. Figure 9 shows the 
regional distribution of the accidents according to the FAA regional zones. The Northwest 
Mountain region contributed to 22.5% of the accidents. Next, the Central region, Great Lakes 
region, and Southern region contributed to 17.5% of the accidents each. Alaska and Eastern 
regions contributed to 7.5% of the accidents each, while New England and Western Pacific 
regions contributed to 5% of the accidents each. 
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 Comparing the FAA GAATA survey
10
 from 2006 to 2009 to the accidents indicates that 
there is no direct correlation between the number of accidents and fleet concentration in a region. 
From 2006 to 2009, Southern region had the most day and night flight hours at 19.7%, while the 
Southwest region was second with 17.1%. Southwest region recorded no icing accident from 
2006 to 2010. The Northwest Mountain region, which recorded the highest number of accidents, 
had 11.4% of the total day and night flight hours. This means that number of flight hours in a 
region and number of accidents are not in direct proportion. IPS equipment, operation and 
effectiveness, exposure to icing conditions, pilot’s management of events and decision making in 
icing conditions are more important factors affecting the occurrence of inflight icing accidents. 
4.2 NASA ASRS Data 
 Thirty inflight icing incidents were identified in the ASRS database. Ten of the incidents 
involved aircraft with IPS systems that were operated during the icing event. The pilots operated 
their IPS with an estimated ½ inch of ice build-up. This is the specification on most IPS 
equipped aircraft; however, technology at this time cannot estimate the thickness of ice build-up. 
When the IPS is ineffective pilots will report to ATC and ATC will advise them to either climb 
or descend to an altitude that is free of icing conditions. The FAA
8
 explains that warmer altitudes 
are not always below the flight’s altitude.  
 The most common event observed in the incident reports is performance degradation. 
Twenty-three out of the 30 incidents were either unable to climb, maintain airspeed and altitude. 
There was a single case in which a pilot descended to an unassigned altitude before 
communicating with ATC. From the reports it appears that ATC has been very supportive in 
guiding pilots out of icing conditions. Under serious conditions, ATC does not hesitate to declare 
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an emergency even if the pilot fails to declare an emergency. The end result has been 
predominantly safe landings at the nearest airport. 
 Nineteen of the incidents also reported accumulation of ice during the cruise phase of the 
flight. This is analogous to the trend identified in the accident database. IMC accounted for 24 of 
the incidents. Some pilots were amazed at the rate of ice accumulation even though they had 
been in icing condition for only a few minutes. In some cases, as little as 2 - 5 minutes were 
enough for pilots to describe the rate of ice accumulation as “very alarming”. Some pilots 
reported that there were no reports of icing en route during their weather briefing, and therefore, 
became overwhelmed when they found themselves accreting ice or in icing conditions.  
4.3 Conclusions 
1.  50% of the accidents occurred under zero surface precipitation at the accident site. 
Snow and rain contributed to 10% each. Freezing rain, freezing drizzle, ice pellets and ice 
crystals also contributed to 2.5% each, while 20% occurred under unknown surface 
precipitation type. From 1978 to 2005
3
 freezing precipitation and snow contributed to 
33% and 32% respectively. This means that surface precipitation data alone is not enough 
for inflight icing prediction. However, inflight precipitation condition is the determining 
factor. 
2.  Out of 40 accidents, 21 occurred under IMC, while 19 occurred under VMC. Out 
of approximately 98.6 million total flight hours from 2006 to 2009, 86% were under 
VMC, with the remaining 14% under IMC. This means that inflight icing is more 
prevalent under IMC exposure than VMC. This was also the trend from 1978 to 2005.
3
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3.  Approximately 62% of the accidents occurred at surface temperatures greater than 
0
o
C, while 38% occurred at surface temperature less than or equal to 0
o
C. All of the 
accidents occurred between +21
o
C and -21
o
C. This means that an aircraft is more likely 
to experience inflight icing conducive temperature when there is a surface temperature 
less than +21
o
C depending on the altitude it flies since temperature linearly decreases in 
the troposphere. 
4.  The Single Reciprocating Engine with 4 or more seats contributed to the greatest 
percentage of the accidents. Sixteen of these accidents operated under FAA Part 91 as 
general aviation aircraft. These aircraft were either not equipped with IPS or their IPS 
status was unknown. IPS has been very useful in preventing inflight icing accidents.  
5.  The 20 to 50 and 50+ twin turboprop engine aircraft and the single reciprocal 
engine aircraft (1 to 3 seats) contributed to the least number of accidents. Most single 
reciprocating engine aircraft are not equipped with IPS and completely avoid flying into 
forecasted icing conditions. The 20 to 50 and 50+ category aircraft are mostly equipped 
with IPS, which allow them to fly in moderate icing conditions. The rigorous training 
requirements of pilots for these types of aircraft might have also contributed to the fewer 
numbers of accidents. 
6.  Aircraft in the cruise phase is more likely to accrete ice than any other phase. Ice 
accretion in 40% of the accidents was detected during the cruise phase of the flights. This 
is consistent with the trend from 1978 to 2005
3
. This is because the cruise phase forms 
the greatest duration of most air transportation. 
7.  Although experience is very important in controlling aircraft under icing 
conditions, there is no clear cut answer as to the amount of experience a pilot needs in 
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icing conditions. Much depends on the intensity and type of ice accreted, the 
effectiveness of the IPS and the pilot’s physical and emotional management of the 
situation. 
8.  Aircraft are more likely to experience stall/loss of control than any other 
aerodynamic performance or stability and control event since icing increases the stall 
speed. From 1978 to 2005 Mr. Green
3
 observed stall/loss of control in most of the 
accidents than any other ASC events. Since the Roselawn accident, manufacturers were 
instructed to specify the procedure for the selection of airspeed during icing conditions.  
9.  Flight concentration or intensity in a region does not have a linear relationship to 
inflight icing accidents. Although the Northwest Mountain recorded the highest number 
of accidents, it only accounted for 11.4% of the total flight hours from 2006 to 2009. The 
Alaskan region with only 2.8% of total flight hours recorded three accidents, while the 
Southwest region with 17.1% of the total flight hours recorded no accident. IPS 
equipment, operation and effectiveness, exposure to icing conditions, pilot’s management 
of events and decision making in icing conditions are more important factors affecting 
the occurrence of inflight icing accidents. 
4.4 Recommendation 
 There is no clear cut answer as to how the various types of icing affect the flying 
capabilities of an aircraft. Although a considerable amount of work has been done on the 
effect of icing on aircraft’s aerodynamics, there is little information about how fast the 
various types of icing affect the handling capabilities of an aircraft. Also, technology at 
this time cannot predict the thickness, type and location of ice on an aircraft inflight. 
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Future research in these areas will help to understand the problem further and manage 
inflight icing more effectively. 
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Appendix I 
Modified GAATA Survey Scale Index 
Table 1: Modified GAATA Survey Aircraft Scale Index, by Steven Green
3
 
Scale Code Scale Definition 
1 RP: 1 – 3 seats Single Reciprocating Engine, 1 to 3 seats 
1 RP: 1 – 4+ seats Single Reciprocating Engine, 4 or more seats 
2 RP: 1 – 6 seats Twin Reciprocating Engine, 1 to 6 seats 
2 RP: 1 – 7+ seats Twin Reciprocating Engine, 7 or more seats 
2 TP: 1 – 12 seats Twin Turboprop Engine, 1 to 12 seats 
2 TP: 13+ seats Twin Turboprop Engine, 13 or more seats (non-air carrier use) 
2 TP: 13 – 19 seats Twin Turboprop Engine, 13 to 19 seats (air carrier use) 
2 TP: 20 – 50 seats Twin Turboprop Engine, 20 to 50 seats (air carrier use) 
2 TP: 50+ seats Twin Turboprop Engine, 50 or more seats (air carrier use) 
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 Tables 2 and 3 illustrate the statistical measure of the meteorological parameters from 
2006 to 2010, and 1978 to 2005 respectively. 
Table 2: Statistical Measure of Surface Meteorological Parameters 
Statistical 
Measure 
Surface 
Temperature 
(
o
F) 
Temperature 
Dew-Point 
(
o
F) 
Wind 
Speed 
(Kts) 
Wind 
Direction 
(Deg) 
Visibility 
 
(sm) 
Ceiling 
 
(ft) 
25 %tile 21.2 6.5 7 180 3 581.5 
50 %tile 33.8 8 8 265 9 1600 
75 %tile 47.3 14 14 310 10 2800 
 
 
Table 3: Interquartile Model of Typical Icing Surface Observation, by Steven Green
3
 
Statistical 
Measure 
Ceiling Visibility Surface 
Temperature 
Temp – Dew 
Point spread 
IQM 1000 feet 3.9 statute miles 0
o
C 1.75
o
C 
1
st
 Quartile 500 feet 2 statute miles -2
o
C 1
o
C 
3
rd
 Quartile 2200 feet 7 statute miles 2
o
C 3.25
o
C 
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 Tables 4 and 5 respectively show the classification of the accident aircraft using the 
GAATA scale index, and the 40 accidents from the NTSB online database.  
Table 4: Classification of Aircrafts using Steven Green’s3 GAATA Modified Scale Index 
Scale Code Scale Definition No of 
Aircrafts 
1 RP: 1 – 3 seats Single Reciprocating Engine, 1 to 3 seats 1 
1 RP: 1 – 4+ seats Single Reciprocating Engine, 4 or more seats 17 
2 RP: 1 – 6 seats Twin Reciprocating Engine, 1 to 6 seats 5 
2 RP: 1 – 7+ seats Twin Reciprocating Engine, 7 or more seats 5 
2 TP: 1 – 12 seats Twin Turboprop Engine, 1 to 12 seats … 
2 TP: 13+ seats Twin Turboprop Engine, 13 or more seats (non-air carrier use) … 
2 TP: 13 – 19 seats Twin Turboprop Engine, 13 to 19 seats (air carrier use) … 
2 TP: 20 – 50 seats Twin Turboprop Engine, 20 to 50 seats (air carrier use) 1 
2 TP: 50+ seats Twin Turboprop Engine, 50 or more seats (air carrier use) 1 
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Table 5: Details of Inflight Icing Accidents (2006 to 2010) 
No 
NTSB 
REPORT ID AIRCRAFT REG No DATE PLACE 
1 CEN11CA135 N385AS 12/25/2010 Troy, MI 
2 ERA11LA048 N7SY 11/5/2010 Winchester, TN 
3 WPR11FA032 N201HF 10/25/2010 Lander, WY 
4 ERA10LA105 N5118J 10/21/2010 Greenbush, ME 
5 ERA10FA148 N7778W 2/23/2010 Springfield, KY 
6 CEN10LA090 N206AV 1/6/2010 Kearney, NE 
7 CEN10LA068 N108L 12/6/2009 Dodge City, KS 
8 WPR10LA059 N2650R 11/20/2009 Susanville, CA 
9 ANCO9LA038 N629SP 5/6/2009 Bethel, AK 
10 CEN09LA206 N402BP 3/10/2009 Aberdeen, SD 
11 DCA09MA027 N200WQ 2/12/2009 Clarence Center, NY 
12 CEN09CA136 N6509T 1/17/2009 Lafayette, IN 
13 CEN09FA135 N840NK 1/15/2009 Wray, CO 
14 CEN09LA122 N92WT 1/6/2009 Three Rivers, MI 
15 CEN09FA099 N9299N 12/19/2008 North Canton, OH 
16 WPR09CA051 N6693A 11/29/2008 Rock River, WY 
17 ANC09LAO12 N36CF 11/14/2008 Napaskiak, AK 
18 NYCO8LA176 N101BX 5/8/2008 Snow Hill, NC 
19 NYCO8FA139 C-FRSK 3/16/2008 Atkins, VA 
20 SEA08LA072 N329BW 2/8/2008 Albany, OR 
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Table 5 continued 
No 
NTSB 
REPORT ID AIRCRAFT REG No DATE PLACE 
21 SEA08FA042 N925TT 12/10/2007 Salmon, ID 
22 ANCO8CA020 N170BP 11/18/2007 Nikolai, AK 
23 LAX08MA007 N430A 10/7/2007 Naches, WA 
24 SEA08FA006 N85WT 10/7/2007 Ekalaka, MT 
25 CH107FA183 N477MD 6/28/2007 Wellsville, MO 
26 CH107FA102 N8969J 4/14/2007 Vibumum, MO 
27 NYCO7LA081 N511AT 3/17/2007 Beverly, MA 
28 ATLO7FA040 N506BC 2/9/2007 Hinesville, GA 
29 DEN07FA059 N45GM 2/9/2007 Great Bend, KS 
30 CH107LA059 N425TN 1/12/2007 Harbor Springs, MI 
31 NYCO7FA051 N400CS 12/26/2006 Johnstown, PA 
32 CH107FA046 N55MB 12/26/2006 Jasper, TN 
33 CH107FA041 N9073P 12/17/2006 Bucyrus, OH 
34 LAX07FA021 N121LD 10/25/2006 Meadview, AZ 
35 DEN06FA131 N787SL 9/15/2006 Maybell, CO 
36 CHI06IA127 N71MT 5/4/2006 Lincoln, NE 
37 DEN06LA050 N33AFC 3/20/2006 Emporia, KS 
38 SEA06FA147 N69KM 1/25/2006 Carson, WA 
39 ATLO6LA035 N87HK 1/13/2006 Childersburg, AL 
40 LAX061A076 N390AE 1/2/2006 Santa Maria, CA 
 
34 
 
Appendix II 
 
 
Figure 1: Distribution of Events by Surface Precipitation Type 
 
 
Figure 2: Distribution of Events by Phase of Flight. 
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Figure 3: IPS Status and Operation 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Distribution of Terminating Events 
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Figure 5: Distribution of Total Flight Hours by Scale 
 
 
Figure 6: Distribution of Events by FAA Part 
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Figure 7: Distribution of Events by FAA Part and Total Flight Hours 
 
 
Figure 8: Distribution of ASC Events by Scale 
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FAA 
Region 
 
Alaska AK  
3 
 
Central 
IA KS MO NE  
 3 2 2  
Eastern 
 
DC DE MD NJ NY PA VA WV 
    1 1 1  
Great 
Lakes 
IL IN MI MN ND OH SD WI 
 1 3   2 1  
New 
England 
CT ME MA NH RI VT   
 1 1     
Northwest 
Mountain 
CO ID MT OR UT WA WY 
2 1 1 1  2 2  
Southern AL FL GA KY MS NC PR SC TN VI 
1  1 1  1   3  
Southwest AR LA NM OK TX  
     
 
 
Western 
Pacific 
AZ CA HI NV 
1 1   
 
Figure 9: Distribution of Events by FAA Regional Zoning 
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